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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Banks and Banking-Survivorship in Joint Accounts
Today the proceeds of numerous joint bank accounts lie dormant
in banks due to the fact that the law regarding the right of survivorship
in joint bank accounts in North Carolina is marked with uncertainty.
Administrators and executors of the estates of deceased parties to these
accounts are uncertain whether to retain the funds for the estates or
whether to award them to the surviving parties to the accounts.1 In
a recent law review note the author discusses the problem of an attempted
transfer of the proceeds of a joint bank account to the survivor of the
parties to the account, but at the time of that writing there were no North
Carolina holdings regarding joint bank accounts executed with a con-
tract for the right of survivorship.2  The purpose of this note is to dis-
cuss the development of the law since the last writing on the subject
and to answer, in so far as possible, the questions raised in that note.
For the purposes of this note joint checking accounts and joint savings
accounts will be treated alike since by both devices it is possible to
create a joint tenancy in the account.
At common law the right of survivorship was an incident of joint
tenancy in real property, and under this rule, the surviving party would
be automatically entitled to the property on the death of the other party.
That rule has been destroyed in North Carolina by statute,8 but the
supreme court has pointed out that the statute does not prohibit joint
tenants from making contracts to provide for survivorship both as to
personalty and realty.4
The law is generally settled as to joint accounts which do not contain
a clause designating survivorship. When the sole owner of the fund
can be ascertained, he, or his estate, will be awarded the entire fund.5
But when the evidence does not establish sole ownership, a presump-
I Professor Fred B. McCall will deal with the problem from the administrator's
point of view in an article to be published in a later issue of this volume of the
LAW REVIEW.
'Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 95 (1952).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1950).
' Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531 at 535, 21 S. E. 202 at 204 (1895). "The Act
of 1784 (code, section 1326) abolishes survivorship where the joint tenancy would
have otherwise been created by the law, but does not operate to prohibit persons
from entering into written contracts as to land, or verbal agreements as to per-
sonalty, such as to make the future rights of the parties depend upon the fact of
survivorship."
'Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952) ; Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226
N. C. 313, 38 S. E. 2d 222 (1946) ; Nannie v. Pollard, 205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E.
341 (1933).
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tion of co-ownership arises and distribution is made accordingly. The
normal effect of depositing money in the name of the owner and another
is to make that other person merely the owner's agent with power to
draw on the account and upon the death of the owner, the agency is re-
voked. Thus, the agent has no right to any part of the account after
the owner's death. 7 The courts of North Carolina hold that such a
deposit does not create a gift nor does it establish a trust, for the owner
does not make a valid delivery of the fund nor does he relinquish con-
trol over the fund.8
It is when the joint account contains a provision for survivorship
that the confusion in the law begins, and this is especially significant
in light of the fact that most, if not all, banks today have such a pro-
vision in their standard signature cards for accounts. Since the gift,
trust, and agency theories will not support the survivor in his claim for
the entire fund, he must resort to a contract with a survivorship clause
to maintain his claim for the whole amount.9 The contract theory orig-
inated with Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank.10 In that case
the depositor made an agreement with the bank that in the event of his
death, his wife was to receive the entire fund in the account. Both hus-
band and wife were named in the account and either was authorized
to withdraw any or all of the fund. In awarding the fund to the widow
the court stressed the fact that the agreement with the bank was a valid
contract between the bank and the depositor, and discounted the con-
tention that the issue was whether or not there was a valid gift.
In a leading case11 the agreement contained the usual statement that
the depositors were joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and not
tenants in common, with the further provision that upon the death of
either party, the fund would become the absolute property of the sur-
vivor. The court upheld this agreement and declared the survivor abso-
lute owner of the balance in the account, emphasizing the contract saying
that there was an agreement made by the bank with its depositors and
that the bank and the depositors were bound by the contract.
North Carolina first recognized the contract theory of survivorship
in Taylor v. Smith'2 in which two sisters who were joint owners of a
I Smith v. Smith, 190 N. C. 764, 130 S. E. 614 (1925) ; Turlington v. Lucas,
186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923). "Under the law of this jurisdiciton, nothing
else appearing, the money to the joint credit in the bank belonged equally to
plaintiff and defendant." Smith v. Smith, supra at 767, 130 S. E. at 615.
7 Hall v. Hall, 235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952) ; Nannie v. Pollard, 205
N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933).
'Jones v. Fulbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929) ; Thomas v. Houston,
181 N. C. 91, 106 S. E. 466 (1921).
'Note, 31 N. C. L. Rs v. 95 (1952).
10222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371 (1915).
"Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N. W. 2d 870 (1951).
22 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
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note made a verbal agreement that the survivor was to be the sole owner
of the note on the death of the other. The court said that the right to
the fund in case one survives the other was a valuable assignable in-
terest, and there was then a valid contract with the mutual rights of
survivorship being the consideration. The same result has been reached
as to stocks,' 3 and in a later case, Jones v. Waldroup,14 the court seems
to have gone a step further in applying the contract theory. In this case
the husband, Mr. R. M. Waldroup, had stock certificates which were
made out to himself alone. He subsequently executed a paper under
seal authorizing the issuing association to transfer the -certificates to the
names of "R. M. Waldroup or Mrs. Hattie L. Waldroup, either or the
survivor." There was evidence introduced to show that Mr. Waldroup
changed the names so that "if anything should happen the other would
cash in without the usual red tape." Witnesses said that Mr. Waldroup
told them he wanted the stock to go to the survivor. In commenting
on this the court said: "We construe the conveyance . . . as creating a
common ownership in the property which is its subject until one of them
should die, with the right of survivorship."'15 The court denied the
plaintiff's contention that the wife was merely an agent of her husband
saying that the husband's intent was clearly to provide for the right of
survivorship in his wife.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the
contract theory in joint tenancies in some instances, there is some ques-
tion as to how far the court will go in allowing persons to contract for
the right of survivorship. Will the court allow one party who has de-
posited money in an account in his own name create by contract the right
of survivorship in another person? Will the court allow a contractual
right of survivorship where one party deposits his own money in an
account in his own name and that of another? Finally, where the con-
tract is allowed, what form must it take?
North Carolina has recognized third party beneficiary contracts
in other areas of the law, but the same is not true with regard to
joint bank accounts. In Wescott v. First & Citizens National Bank
of Elizabeth City16 the court struck down an attempt to create the
right of survivorship in one not a party to the account. A soldier in
Italy had sent money to the bank with a letter stating: "I wish to
establish an account with your bank. . . In case I become deceased
"Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N. C. 679, 132 S. E. 796 (1926). Two brothers
owned stock in a bank and made an agreement that upon the death of either, the
stock was to go to the survivor at par. The court stated that the agreement "is
a contract made by each and both parties . . . to sell to the survivor.. .. " Id.
at 683, 132 S. E. at 799.
"217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. 2d 366 (1940).
'BId. at 188, 7 S. E. 2d at 371.1 f227 N. C. 39, 40 S. E. 2d 461 (1946).
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I would like to make an agreement with you so as to make my bene-
ficiary my grandfather . .. to receive the money ... ." It was also
stated that this was to be an "in trust for account," and the court denied
the grandfather's claim due to the failure of the trust. No mention was
made of an attempted contract for survivorship nor of a contract to
establish a trust though the bank had accepted the deposit along with
the letter containing the agreement. Thus, this might be considered
authority for the proposition that our court will not recognize a third
party beneficiary contract in regard to joint bank accounts where both
parties are not named in the account.
Where both parties are named in the account, but it is determined
that one party is the sole owner of the fund, North Carolina authority
is to the effect that the sole owner, or his estate, will be awarded the
fund though there be a clause providing for survivorship.17 Thus, there
is an apparent requirement that the parties must not only be named
in the account, but that they must also be joint owners of the fund.
In the latest case in North Carolina, Bowling v. Bowling,'8 there
were four funds in question. The first was a joint savings account
opened by Mrs. Bowling with funds she had withdrawn from an account
in her own name. Later funds from another joint account of Dr. and
Mrs. Bowling were added to the savings account. The source of all the
other deposits and withdrawals is not determinable from the record.
This account initiated by Mrs. Bowling was recorded in the following
name: "Mrs. Agnes P. Bowling and/or Dr. W. W. Bowling, 1017
Demerius Street." Through error there was no joint account card
executed, but the bank had recognized the account as joint with the
survivor having a right to withdraw the entire fund.
The second account was an optional savings account opened by a
cash deposit and execution of a written agreement with respect to such
account. The agreement was as follows: "It is understood and agreed
that the shares hereby subscribed for are issued by the association,
and all moneys paid or that may hereafter be paid thereon are held by
the association for our account, as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship and not as tenants in common, and that said shares may be resold
subject to the by-laws of the association, by either before or after the
death of either, and either is authorized to pledge the same as collateral
security to a loan." Both Dr. and Mrs. Bowling signed the agreement.
Money deposits were made by Mrs. Bowling, but the source of all de-
posits is undetermined.
The third account was a savings share certificate account opened by
a deposit and the execution of a written agreement with the association
17 See note 5 supra.
18 243 N. C. 515, 91 S. E. 2d 176 (1955).
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which read as follows: "Membership of joint holders (with right of
survivorship) of a share account. The undersigned hereby apply for a
membership and for a JOINT share account in the FIRST FEDERAL
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF DURHAm and for the issuance of
evidence of membership in the approved form in the joint names of
the undersigned as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not
as tenants in common." There is no record of the source of the de-
posits in this account.
The fourth fund in question was One Hundred Twenty Five shares
of common stock of Life & Casualty Company of Tennessee and was
registered as follows: 'William W. Bowling and Mrs. Agnes Paulk
Bowling, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common." There is no record of who purchased or possessed
the stock. Thus, whether there was sole ownership or joint ownership
of the fund is undeterminable.
As to the first account, the lower court said: "... the facts are in-
sufficient to establish that either the estate of William W. Bowling,
deceased, or Agnes P. Bowling is the sole owner of the entire fund
in this account. A presumption of equal ownership by the co-depositors
of said funds applies to the account."u9 The account was awarded one-
half to Dr. Bowling's estate and one-half to Mrs. Bowling. For identical
reasons, the court reached the same result in regard to the fourth fund,
common stock of Life & Casualty Company of Tennessee.
As to the second and third accounts, the lower court awarded the
entire funds to Mrs. Bowling saying: "There was a valid written con-
tract covering this account which was executed by W. V. Bowling
and Agnes P. Bowling .... By the terms of said contract it was agreed
that the survivor . . . would be the sole owner of the funds on de-
posit .... ",20
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in es-
sentially the same language. As to the second and third accounts the
court made the following comment: ". . and since the parties having
contracted and agreed that the savings accounts described hereinabove
as the second and third items, respectively, were held by them as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common,
the right of survivorship existed .... ,,21
The court in refusing to award Mrs. Bowling the entire amount
in the first and fourth funds, has in effect, denied the validity of a sur-
vivorship clause which does no more than say that the fund is payable
to "either or the survivor." Though this clause was not present in the
"' Bowling v. Bowling, Record on appeal at page 19 (1955).20Id. at 20.
2 Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N. C. 515 at 520, 91 S. E. 2d 176 at 180 (1955).
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first account, the account was recognized by the bank as one with the
right of survivorship in it. The clause was expressed in the stock
certificate as quoted above. The court in failing to recognize the clause
standing alone has followed its decisions of the past.
2 2
In the Bowling case it was shown that the surviving wife had con-
tributed to the first account, but still the court ignored the survivorship
clause standing alone. Perhaps this was because she did not contest the
lower court's ruling giving her one-half the account, but it seems safe to
say that the court probably will continue to ignore such clauses which
might well be a result of banking practice rather than an honest attempt
by the depositors to contract for the right of survivorship. In the two
accounts which the court did award the widow in the Bowling case
there were express contracts executed with the opening of the accounts.
These agreements specifically and unequivocally designated the sur-
vivor as having sole rights to the funds. The language is that usually
seen in specific and detailed contracts. The court seems to require that
the parties spell out the meaning of the clause, "payable to either or the
survivor." Though this seems to be merely an academic distinction, the
detailed form leaves no room for doubt that the parties intended for the
survivor to take the balance of the account.
The two accounts which the court awarded the widow were composed
of deposits made by both parties to the account; there was no question
as to the parties being co-owners. Where sole ownership has been
established, the court has consistently given the remainder to that party,
or his estate, who was the sole owner of the fund in the account.23 Only
where there was joint ownership did the court allow a contract for sur-
vivorship in a joint account.24  Thus, we apparently have two pre-
requisites to the formation of a valid contract as to joint bank accounts.
The parties must be co-owners, and they must execute a contract spelling
out their intent to create a right of survivorship in the survivor. Any-
thing less has yet to succeed in securing that right in North Carolina.
The exact form which the contract must take is not specified in the
Bowling case or any other case, but in the opinion of the Attorney
General the following has been held to be sufficient under Taylor v.
Smith25 and Jones v. Waldrou p26 to vest title in the survivor of the
joint account:
21 Pope v. Burgess, 230 N. C. 323, 53 S. E. 2d 159 (1949); Buffaloe v. Barnes,
226 N. C. 313, 38 S. E. 2d 222 (1946). In Buffaloe v. Barnes supra, the court
said there was no agreement nor oral evidence of an agreement. Evidently the
court simply refuses to see an agreement in an account labled as a joint account
with the right of survivorship. Also in that case the stock was purchased with
the husband's money and undoubtedly this had a bearing on the court's decision
in that it spoke of the absence of any consideration flowing from the wife.
2 Cases cited note 5, supra.
2 Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).2 Ibid. " 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. 2d 366 (1940).
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"We , and , the undersigned, do hereby apply
for membership in the Federal Savings and Loan Association of
and for the issuance of evidence of membership in the
approved form in the joint names of the undersigned who have
and do hereby agree as between us that the same shall be held
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants
in common, regardless of who places the funds in said account.
And it is definitely understood between us that in the case of
death of either of us the survivor shall be the owner of this entire
account, both principal and dividend which may be due at the
time of the death of either of us. .... ,,2
It will be noticed that the Attorney General's opinion was careful
to state that the agreement was between the depositors; no mention was
made of the bank as a party to the agreement. This is interesting in
light of the fact that the court in the Bowling case did not mention
G. S. 53-146.28 Heretofore the statute served to protect the bank, but
in light of the contract theory, it does not seem unreasonable to ques-
tion its application where the court has found a valid contract. There
would be no problem where the^ bank paid the survivor, but if the
bank should pay the fund to the estate of the deceased, then there is
an apparent breach of the contract with the surviving depositor. Thus,
the question arises: is the bank protected by statute in an apparent
breach of contract? Of course, there is the contention that the contract
is between the depositors only and that the bank is not a party to such
contract, but this position is logically untenable. When one man makes
a deposit with the bank, the bank is bound to pay him, and only him,
the fund on deposit. It is elementary that if the bank allowed a with-
drawal by a stranger, it would be liable to the depositor for breach of its
contract in the amount paid out. The same result would obtain where
there are two depositors as well as where there is only one. When an
agreement is excecuted at the time of deposit, the deposit should be
construed in the light of that agreement. The bank is a party to the
deposit, accepting it on the terms of the agreement. Contract law
would not allow the bank to accept the deposit and yet assert that it
was not a party to the agreement which controls the deposit. It seems
to follow that when a valid agreement is found, the depositors and the
depositary are all bound by it. One writer29 in discussing such con-
" Opinion of Attorney General to Hon. W. E. Church, Clerk of Forsyth Su-
perior Court, dated 9 October 1945.
2 8 N. C. GEN. STAT. 53-146 (1950). The statute provides that when a deposit
is made in names of two persons payable to either, or payable to either or the
survivor, it is payable to either whether the other is living or not. Courts have
consistently held that the statute is for the protection of the bank only and is not
controlling as to ownership of the funds. 9 N. C. L. REv. 15 (1930).28Note, 38 HAmv. L. REv. 243.
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tracts says: ". . . B's interest is not one transferred from A ... but is a
legal interest directly created in B by the depositary's promise to pay
A or B, as joint obligees." It seems, the bank makes a direct promise
to B when both A and B sign the signature card. If B does not sign,
it still is the intention that the bank is obligated to pay B on A's death.
The making of the deposit is certainly sufficient consideration flowing
from both depositors for the obligation of the bank.
That the statute expressly protects the bank is not denied, but
neither is it denied that G. S. § 41-2 expressly abolishes the right of
survivorship in joint tenancies, and yet the Supreme Court has said
many times that the statute (41-2) does not prohibit the making of
contracts to provide for such a right.80 Thus, there would seem to be
nothing in G. S. § 53-146 to prohibit the banks from contracting away
the protection which the statute confers upon them in the same manner.
Further it does not seem a wrong to take away such protection where a
bank has voluntarily chosen to accept a deposit which carries with it the
obligation of the bank to pay the survivor and only the survivor. To
do otherwise would be a clear breach of contract. Yet, such a construc-
tion of the statute and court decisions affecting it would place banks in
the dubious position from which they were lifted with the initial passage
of the statute. Banks would act at their peril when determining the
validity of an agreement before paying the fund to anyone but the sur-
vivor.
The foregoing emphasizes the need for a standard form of contract
which will be universally recognized in North Carolina as valid for
creating the right of survivorship. A bill providing such a form was
presented to the North Carolina General Assembly in 1953 and 1955,81
and each time the bill was defeated for the reason that it might result in
defeating creditor's rights. The Legislature should recognize that court
decisions in time will effect the same result but amid much argument
and confusion. Creditors' rights in this instance will eventually yield to
those who form valid contracts with banks. There is no reason to make
it an uneasy process for the depositor and the bank when all that can be
gained is delay.
CALVIN W. BELL
'Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. 2d 366 (1940); Turlington v.
Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923) ; Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531, 21
S. E. 202 (1895).
"Address by William F. Womble, Thirty-seventh annual conference of the
association of superior court clerks of North Carolina, July 7, 1955.
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